Introduction
In the wake of the global financial crisis that erupted in 2008, the phenomenon of global imbalances, characterized by large United States (US) current account deficits funded primarily by East Asian economies and oil-producing countries, has been center stage in the debate about the causes of the crisis and the needed reform of the international financial architecture.
1 Figure 1 shows that since the late 1990s the US current account deficit has grown continuously, exceeding 5% of US gross domestic product (GDP) in 2003 and peaking in 2006 at over 6%. The counterparts to the US current account deficits are the large surpluses of [the People's Republic of] China (PRC), Japan, and members of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). The PRC's relative contribution to US current account deficits has grown remarkably rapidly over the past decade. Understanding the factors behind global imbalances matters for assessing how they may evolve in the future. It also matters for assessing the potential threat that imbalances pose to future global financial and economic stability, along with the measures that policy makers must take to -rebalance‖ the global economy. Academics and policy analysts have offered various conflicting views on the roots and sustainability of global imbalances. Following Serven and Nguyen (2010), we can group these views into two camps. The first view considers global imbalances as an unsustainable phenomenon whose impending correction must entail a US current account adjustment and a sharp depreciation of the US dollar, coupled with a sudden curtailment of capital flows into the US (Roubini 2008; Roubini and Mihm 2010). The second view takes the opposite (more benign) perspective: global imbalances represent an equilibrium situation that, absent changes in the underlying determinants, can be self-sustaining. In other words, this view explains global imbalances as the result of fundamentals and/or policies adopted by other countries that have led to a steady accumulation of US assets by the rest of the world. Thus, without changes in such fundamentals and policy choices, global imbalances can and will persist. 1 Proponents of both views agree that the global imbalances of the last decade have been accompanied by massive capital flows from East Asian economies to the US. Using US Treasury International Capital (TIC) data on foreign holdings of US securities-in the form of equities, bonds, and bank lending-during the period 2001-07, Lee (2011) finds that most East Asian economies have invested more in the US than the optimal level suggested by the gravity model. Such overinvestment is more evident in long-term bonds than in equities or bank lending. These results confirm the existence of sizable imbalances between East Asian economies and the US which, in turn, contribute substantially to global imbalances. Lee and Byun (2013) further find that major East Asian economies continued to over-invest in US financial markets even after the global financial crisis.
In a similar vein to Lee and Byun (2013), this paper aims to assess whether global imbalances have undergone any fundamental structural changes since the global financial crisis of 2008/09. In particular, we aim to assess whether excessive savings, partly due to the underdevelopment of social safety nets and the accumulation of large foreign exchange reserves, have contributed to the excessive investment positions of The PRC and other East Asian economies in US financial markets.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes data on and the magnitude of bilateral holdings of US assets among East Asian economies. Section 3 introduces a simple theoretical framework to generate testable gravity equations for cross-border asset holdings. In this section, we propose three different empirical specifications to test the determinants of bilateral holdings. In Section 4, we report and discuss our main empirical findings. Finally, Section 5 brings the paper to a close with some further discussion and concluding remarks.
East Asian Holdings of US Financial Assets
The data used in this study are drawn from the US TIC online system, which provides data on cross-border portfolio investment positions between US residents and foreign residents. Since 2002, surveys on foreign portfolio holdings of US securities have been conducted annually to measure foreign holdings of US short-and long-term securities as of end-June each year. Meanwhile, US portfolio holdings of foreign securities are reported annually as of end-December. Securities are broken down into equities and debt, which is further broken down into Treasury bonds, agency bonds, and corporate bonds. On the other hand, the pattern for long-term bond investment is the polar opposite of the pattern for equity investment (Table 3) Taking all of the above into account, in 2007/08, East Asian economies experienced a relatively small deficit with the US in equity investments but a much larger surplus in long-term bond investments. Therefore, we can see that trans-Pacific imbalances were caused by bond, rather than equity, investments. This tendency persisted, and even intensified, after the global crisis.
Figures 3, 4, and 5 reconfirm these patterns. 2 Figure 3 shows that The PRC's net portfolio investment vis-à-vis the US expanded rapidly, and The PRC overtook Japan to become the largest investor in the US. Figures 4 and 5 show that bond, rather than equity, investments drove the rapid expansion of East Asia's portfolio investments in the US. Both trends persisted after the global crisis. Table 4 shows the bank lending positions of East Asian economies vis-à-vis the US. In 2007/08, East Asia's bank lending to the US exceeded bank borrowing from the US, but the magnitude was much smaller than that of bond investments. In September 2012, in Hong Kong, China; Japan; and the Republic of Korea, bank borrowing from the US exceeded bank lending to the US. As a result, East Asia's bank lending position vis-à-vis the US is now roughly in balance. Figure 6 shows that East Asia's net bank lending position has declined since 2009/10.
Empirical Specifications
As noted in the introduction, we use the gravity equation to assess whether the global financial crisis has changed the "excessive" investment behavior of East Asian economies in US financial markets. Since Tinbergen (1962) and Pöyhönen (1963) , the simple gravity equation, in which the volume of trade between two countries is proportional to the product of their masses (GDPs) and inversely related to the distance between them, has proved highly successful empirically. Recently, with renewed interest among economists in geography, the model has again become widely used in the literature. Indeed, many researchers have shown that the gravity equation can be derived from many different models of international trade. 
Benchmark Specification
Though the gravity model in the form of the log-linearized equation is commonly used in estimating the pattern of international trade, this might lead to biases when the presence of heteroskedacity is severe, as has been argued in Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) . As an alternative, Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) suggest that the gravity model be estimated in its multiplicative form and use a Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood (PPML) estimator that is usually used for count data. Therefore, using the PPML estimator, we estimate a multiplicative form model (i.e., without taking the log of the value of assets as the dependent variable). As there is only one home country, the US, we use the following reduced form gravity equation as a benchmark specification:
Asset it = α+β 1 This index measures capital controls and restrictions on foreign investment and ownership, taking a value between 0 and 1. The higher the value, the lower the restrictions on foreign investment and capital controls, and hence the more liberalized the capital market.
As explained in the previous section, holdings of securities are measured annually in June, with the most recent values as of end-June 2012. Therefore, to allow for some time lag, the dependent variable is matched with the previous year's values of explanatory variables. favorable fiscal treatment. Following The Economist, offshore financial centers in our sample are Bahrain; Barbados; Bermuda; Costa Rica; Cyprus; Hong Kong, China; Ireland; Luxembourg; Malta; and Panama. 6 There are 11 East Asian economies in our sample: [the People's Republic of] China; Hong Kong, China; Indonesia; Japan; the Republic of Korea; Malaysia; the Philippines; Singapore; Thailand; Taipei,China; and Viet Nam. As we aim to assess whether the global financial crisis prompted changes in East Asian economies' portfolio investment and bank lending in US financial markets, Equation (1) is estimated for the two sub-periods: pre-crisis (2004-08) and post-crisis (2009-12).
An Extended Specification with Year-Specific Effects
It is reasonable to ask whether the excessive holdings of US securities by East Asian economies built up gradually before the crisis and then declined gradually after the crisis. Therefore, with the inclusion of eight interaction dummy variables of East Asia dummy and eight year dummy variables, we will also run the following equation:
Asset it = α+β 1 
An Extended Specification with Economy-Specific Effects
It also seems reasonable to ask whether our results are dominated by any particular Asian economy. Thus, in order to compare how different East Asian economies behave in their holdings of US securities, we will replace the East Asia dummy in Equation (1) with 11 East Asian economy dummies:
Asset it = α+β 1 lnPOP it +β 2 logPCGDP it +β 3 logτ it + β 4 CH + β 5 HK + β 6 ID + β 7 JP + β 8 KR + β 9 MY + β 11 PH + β 11 SG + β 12 TH + β 13 TP+β 14 VN + u t + e it (3) where CH (People's Republic of China); HK (Hong Kong, China); ID (Indonesia); JP (Japan); KR (the Republic of Korea); MY (Malaysia); PH (the Philippines); SG (Singapore); TH (Thailand); TP (Taipei,China); and VN (Viet Nam) are dummy variables for each of the East Asian economies.
Empirical Results

Benchmark Results
Regression results obtained estimating Equation (1) by the PPML model are reported in Table 5 . Columns (1) - (3) . US securities are held more by residents of economies that are larger in terms of population, richer, and closer geographically to the US. US securities are also held more by residents of economies with a greater degree of financial market freedom and residents of offshore financial centers. In contrast, residents of economies that share common borders and colonial experiences with the US do not appear to hold a greater amount of US securities such as equities and long-term bonds.
Above and beyond these effects, do the residents of the 11 East Asian economies tend to hold more-than-expected levels of securities issued by the US? The answer is -yes.‖ The coefficients of 0.895, 1.391, and 0.932 for the East Asia dummy illustrate that the 11 East Asian economies held 145%, 302%, and 254% more US equities, long-term bonds, and bank credits, respectively, than non-East Asian economies.
9 Thus, we have evidence that the East Asian economies held relatively excessive amounts of US securities before the global financial crisis, which might contribute to the global imbalances between the US and East Asian economies.
Looking at columns (4) -(6), the estimated coefficients for the East Asia dummy do not seem to be noticeably different during the period after the global financial crisis, thus indicating that East Asian economies still held excessive amounts of US securities even after the crisis. In addition, the equation for the long-term bond holdings continues to yield the largest estimate for the East Asian dummy, suggesting that among the three types of cross-border capital investment, long-term bonds are the most excessively held securities among East Asian economies.
As a comparison, Table 6 reports the results with the random effects model in which the dependent variable is in the form of a natural logarithm. 10 In general, the results obtained from the random effect model are qualitatively similar to the results from the PPML model, but the sizes of the estimated coefficients for the East Asian dummies are larger in all equations except for the equation for bank lending after the crisis. Specifically, before the crisis, the coefficients were 1.709, 2.365, and 1.117 for the equations of equities, long-term bonds, and bank lending, respectively. This suggests that the 11 East Asian economies held 452%, 964%, and 206% more US equities, longterm bonds, and bank credits, respectively, than non-East Asian economies.
11 Even though the size becomes larger in the random effects model, the two major findings of 9 145% = (exp(0.895)-1)*100; 302% = (exp(1.391)-1)*100; and 154% = (exp(0.932)-1)*100. 10 Note that we do not employ the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimator because with the economy fixed effects, we are unable to estimate the coefficient for the East Asia dummy, the key variable of our interest. 11 452% = (exp(1.527)-1)*100; 964% = (exp(2.365)-1)*100; and 206% = (exp(1.117)-1)*100. the PPML model continue to hold in the post-crisis period: (i) the excessive holdings of US securities by the residents of East Asian economies persists, and (ii) the equation for long-term bond holdings yields the largest estimate for the East Asian dummy. Table 7 reports the results when the long-term bonds are split into Treasury bonds, agency bonds, and corporate bonds. In all three equations, the East Asia dummy variable carries the positive and significant coefficients, suggesting that compared with non-East Asian economies, East Asian economies held excessive amounts of US bonds in the post-crisis period. The size of the coefficient for the East Asia dummy appears to become smaller in the equations for Treasury and corporate bonds, while it becomes larger in the equation for agency bonds. Thus, the East Asia effect is the largest in the equation for agency bonds after the global financial crisis.
Year-Specific East Asian Effects
Here, we seek to investigate whether the East Asia effect gradually strengthened or weakened before and after the global financial crisis of 2008/09. The PPML results obtained by running Equation (3) are reported in Table 8 . Note that for the sake of brevity the estimated coefficients for other control variables are not shown.
As can be seen in the table, the magnitude of the estimated coefficients of the East Asia dummy in the equation for equities increased gradually from 0.615 in 2005 to 1.346 in 2009, while the estimated coefficients for long-term debt and bank loans do not seem to show an increasing trend. After the crisis, the estimated coefficients for the East Asia dummy in the equities and long-term bonds equations gradually decreased, suggesting that the excessiveness of East Asia's holdings of US securities gradually weakened after the global financial crisis.
Among the three types of securities, the coefficient for long-term debt remains the largest until 2011, before becoming insignificant in 2012. When the long-term bond coefficient is split into Treasury bonds, agency bonds, and corporate bonds, agency bonds yield the largest coefficients throughout the entire period. Indeed, the coefficient for the East Asia dummy in the equation for agency bonds appears to have gradually increased until 2010.
Economy-Specific Effects
Having found that East Asian economies as a whole hold excessive amounts of US securities, we seek to assess any economy-specific effects. Table 9 reports the results for the economy-specific East Asia effects obtained from regressing Equation (3) . Note that for the sake of brevity the estimated coefficients for other control variables are not shown.
Before the global financial crisis, most East Asian economies-except for Hong Kong, China; the Republic of Korea (equities); and the Philippines (bank loans)-appeared to have held excessive amount of US securities, irrespective of security type. In particular, the excessiveness was the largest for The PRC for equities and long-term bonds. After the crisis, most East Asian economies continued to hold excessive amounts of US equities, but the degree of excessiveness appears to have declined for some economies, including The PRC for all three types of financial assets. However, The PRC still has the largest excessive holdings of US securities. Table 10 reports the results for the three different types of long-term bonds before and after the crisis. Focusing on columns (4) -(6) for the period after the global financial crisis, among the three types of long-term bonds, it is agency bonds that yield the largest coefficient for many East Asian economies including The PRC; Hong Kong, China; Indonesia; Japan; the Republic of Korea; Malaysia; Singapore; and Taipei,China. It is interesting to note that the size of the coefficients for these individual economy dummies in the equation for agency bonds became larger after the crisis; in the equations for Treasury bonds and corporate bonds, the coefficients became smaller after the crisis for some East Asian economies.
Discussion and Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we assess whether there have been structural changes in global imbalances since the global financial crisis. In particular, we look at whether the very large investments of The PRC, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and other East Asian economies in US equities, bonds, and bank lending have declined since the global crisis.
Our econometric analysis, based on the gravity model to identify the determinants of foreign portfolio investment in the US, finds that with the exception of Hong Kong, China, the overinvestment in the US by most East Asian economies has remained substantial since the global crisis, especially with respect to long-term bonds. That is, even after the crisis, most East Asian economies continue to hold excessive amounts of US securities, but the degree of excessiveness appears to have declined for some economies, including The PRC for all three types of financial assets. However, The PRC still has the largest excessive holdings of US securities.
Our results raise the possibility that the imbalances are an equilibrium state conditional on the various fundamentals underlying financial markets. Therefore, at a broader level, our results can be interpreted to support the prospect of the present imbalances persisting unless the fundamentals are addressed. In order to assess the validity of these arguments, we re-estimate Equation (1) with two additional explanatory variables: the domestic savings-investment ratio (savingsinvestment ratio) and the log of foreign exchange reserves (LogReserves). The results of the re-estimation are reported in Table 11 . As expected, the savings-investment ratio has positive and significant coefficients for equities, long-term debt, and bank loans. Therefore, countries with more domestic savings relative to domestic investment tend to hold larger amounts of US securities, irrespective of security type. One thing to note here is that the size of the coefficients for the savings-investment ratio become smaller after the global financial crisis, suggesting that the global savings glut still matters but to a lesser degree. The reason for this merits further investigation in future research.
In contrast, before the crisis the log of foreign exchange reserves carries a significant and positive coefficient only for bank lending, while it carries a negative and significant coefficient for long-term debt. After the crisis, however, its coefficient becomes positive and significant for all three types of securities. This finding also merits further investigation in future research. Table 12 reports the results when long-term debt is split into Treasury bonds, agency bonds, and corporate bonds. Before the crisis, the log of foreign exchange reserves has a significant and positive coefficient for Treasury bonds, but a significant and negative coefficient for corporate bonds. In terms of absolute size and the significance level, foreign exchange reserves have a stronger effect on corporate bonds, leading to the significant and negative coefficient for the overall longer-term debt equation shown in Table 11 . After the crisis, the positive effect of foreign exchange reserves became stronger and more significant on Treasury bonds and agency bonds.
Comparing Tables 5 and 10 with Tables 6 and 11 , yields some interesting insights. With the inclusion of the savings-investment ratio and foreign exchange reserves, the estimated coefficients for the East Asian economy dummy variable become smaller for all securities, except corporate bonds. This suggests that East Asian economies hold excessive amounts of US securities largely due to their excessive savings and foreign exchange reserves.
Therefore, there is a need for The PRC and other East Asian economies to strengthen their social safety nets in order to curtail excessive savings and nurture healthy consumption. Furthermore, East Asia should strive to refrain from disproportionate foreign exchange reserves accumulation and shift toward a growth paradigm in which domestic demand plays a larger role. In the long-run, the region should strive for broader, deeper, and more liquid and sophisticated financial markets. In this respect, it is necessary to further expand and strengthen the Chiang Mai Initiative, which emerged as a regional response to the 1997/98 Asian financial crisis, and the Asian Bond Market Initiative. 
